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I. INTRODUCTION
Tax accrual workpapers,' which document an independent accountant's in-
vestigation and evaluation of a corporation's potential liability, have become the
focus of Internal Revenue Service (IRS or Service) interest. 2 To gain access to these
workpapers the Service has begun to invoke section 7602 of the Internal Revenue
Code,3 which authorizes IRS examination of relevant books, papers, records, and
other data, to determine a taxpayer's tax liability, to ascertain the correctness of a
return, or to collect the tax. The accounting profession's resistance to this relatively
recent IRS practice has generated substantial litigation, considerable controversy
within the legal and accounting professions, and a vast split among the federal
appellate courts. 4
Two federal circuit courts have decided the issue of IRS access to independent
accountants' tax accrual workpapers. 5 A third has decided the issue only as it pertains
to in-house accountants. 6 Each of the courts, however, has reached a different con-
1. See infra text accompanying notes 38-56.
2. See Note, Government Access to Corporate Documents and Auditors' Workpapers: Shall We Include Auditors
Among the Privileged Few?, 2 J. CoRP. L. 349, 349-50 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Note, Government Access to
Corporate Documents]. The tax accrual workpapers "are of particular interest to the IRS because they contain estimates
of a client's exposure to liability for additional income taxes, and, more important, because they pinpoint the precise
issues that the client thinks are vulnerable to IRS attack during a tax examination." Caplin, Should the Service Be
Permitted to Reach Accountants' Tax Accrual Workpapers?, 51 J. TAX'N 194, 194 (1979).
3. I.R.C. § 7602 (West Supp. 1982), dealing with the examination of books and witnesses, provides:
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where none has been made,
determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any
transferee or fiduciary of any person in respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liability, the
Secretary is authorized-
(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant or material to such
inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any officer or employee of such
person, or any person having possession, custody, or care of books of account containing entries relating to
the business of the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary may
deem proper, to appear before the Secretary at a time and place named in the summons and to produce such
books, papers, records, or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material
to such inquiry; and,
(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such
inquiry.
4. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 217 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1180 (1983).
5. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1180 (1983);
United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977).
6. United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3342 (U.S.
Oct. 22, 1982) (No. 82-716).
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clusion. In United States v. Coopers & Lybrand,7 a 1977 case, the Tenth Circuit
denied the IRS access to an independent accountant's tax accrual workpapers because
the court found that the documents were not "relevant" to determining the correct-
ness of the taxpayer's tax return.8 Five years later, in United States v. Arthur Young
& Co.,9 the Second Circuit rejected the lack of relevance argument, but nonetheless
shielded the independent accountant's tax accrual workpapers under a work product
theory.' ° In United States v. El Paso Co.' 1 the Fifth Circuit rejected both the lack of
relevance and the work product theories and ordered the taxpayer's in-house account-
ants to produce the requested tax accrual workpapers.12 Thus, three approaches
presently exist. To protect tax accrual workpapers, an independent accountant must
argue their lack of relevance in the Tenth Circuit, assert the need for a type of work
product protection in the Second Circuit, and distinguish the El Paso decision in the
Fifth Circuit.
After providing background information on audit procedures and an explanation
of tax accrual workpapers, this Comment will discuss five justifications for protecting
an auditor's tax accrual workpapers. The first approach is the Tenth Circuit's rele-
vance argument, which asserts that tax accrual workpapers deserve protection be-
cause they are not "relevant" to determining the correctness of a tax return or the
amount of tax liability.' 3 Although this approach recognizes the multiplicity of issues
and interests involved when considering IRS access to tax accrual workpapers, it
attempts to balance the competing interests on an improper scale. The relevance
concept was designed to ensure some logical connection between the tax accrual
workpapers and the Service's determination of a tax return's correctness. Because
few documents are more likely to throw light upon the correctness of a tax return than
are tax accrual workpapers, this approach is rejected as inadequate. 4
The other approaches stem from United States v. Euge,15 in which the Supreme
Court noted that the Service's summons authority may be limited by (1) an express
statutory prohibition,' 6 (2) traditional privileges and limitations, 17 and (3) substantial
countervailing policies. 18 No express statutory prohibition exists.' 9 Nonetheless, the
work product doctrine or the concept of privilege could be applied to protect an
accountant's workpapers. Application of either concept to the accountant is imperfect
and requires that the theory be stretched beyond presently existing boundaries. This
Comment rejects the work product doctrine2" and recommends the judicial creation of
7. 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977).
8. See infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
9. 677 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1180 (1983).
10. See infra notes 110-19 and accompanying text and notes 214-19 and accompanying text.
11. 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3342 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1982) (No. 82-716).
12. Id. at 545.
13. United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 550 F.2d 615, 621 (10th Cir. 1977).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 64-97.
15. 444 U.S. 707 (1980).
16. Id. at 711.
17. Id. at 714.
18. Id. at 711.
19. See infra subpart 1I (B).
20. See infra subpart III (C)(1).
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a limited accountant-client privilege. 2' Because many courts disfavor the creation of
a novel privilege, however, a final approach, which balances the IRS interests against
all substantial countervailing policy considerations, is presented. Balancing all con-
siderations is proper within this approach and plainly supports protecting an account-
ant's tax accrual workpapers.22
II. BACKGROUND
The Securities Act of 193323 and the Securities Exchange Act of 193424 require
that certified financial statements accompany the registration statement and pro-
spectus of an initial public security offering and all subsequent annual reports filed
with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC).25 An accountant reviews the var-
ious components of the financial statement by conducting an audit:26 examining and
verifying the financial assessments of corporate management to determine whether
they "present fairly the financial information they purport to convey."-27 The auditor
is guided to the proper scope and depth of the audit by SEC requirements,2 8 "gener-
ally accepted auditing standards, ' 29 and the possibility of personal liability, both
civil and criminal.3 0
21. See infra subpart IlI (C)(2).
22. See infra subpart Ill (D).
23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976).
24. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78-78ii (1976).
25. See Note, Government Access to Corporate Documents, supra note 2, at 353 n. 13. The author notes that an audit
is required whenever a corporation wants to
register a new stock issue, Securities Act of 1933 Schedule A (25)-(27), 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1970); register
securities for listing on an exchange, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 12(b)(1)(J)-(L), 12(g)(1), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 781(b)(l)(J)-(L), 781(g)(1) (1970); solicit proxies in order to issue securities, modify a class of securities, or
attempt a merger, Schedule 14A, Item 15, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1976); file annual 10-K reports with the
Commission, SEC Form 10-K... ; or issue the annual report to shareholders in connection with solicitations
of proxies, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b)(3)-(4) (1976).
Id.
26. Brief for Petitioner-Appellee at 6, United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.
granted, 103 S. Ct. 1180 (1983).
27. SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 590 F.2d 787, 788 n.2 (9th Cir. 1979).
28. Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210 (1982) is the principle regulation concerning the content and form of the
corporation's financial statements. See generally Note, Government Access to Corporate Documents, supra note 2, at
357.
29. AMERICAN INsTMM OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, STATEMENTS ON AUDITING STANDARDS No. 1 §
150 (1972). "The objective of the ordinary examination of financial statements by the independent auditor is the
expression of an opinion on the fairness with which they present financial position, result of operations, and changes in
financial position in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles." Id. § 110.01. These accounting princi-
ples are promulgated, in part, by the Financial Accounting Standards Board. See Note, Government Access to Corporate
Documents, supra note 2, at 353 n.13.
One generally accepted accounting principle requires that losses should be accrued by a charge to income if the future
event that will fix the loss is "probable" (likely to occur), and the amount of loss can be reasonably estimated. Losses that
are "reasonably possible" (more than remote but less than likely) must be disclosed in the financial statements, but need
not be accrued. FINANCIAL AccouNT NG STANDARDS BOARD, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No.
5: AccoUriNG FOR CorriNoENciEs 1, 33-39 (1976).
A "contingency" is defined as "an existing condition, situation, or set of circumstances involving uncertainty as to
possible gain... or loss... to an enterprise that will ultimately be resolved when one or more future events occur or
fail to occur." Id. 1. See generally J. BOOKER & B. JARNAOiN, FINANCIAL AccOUNTING STANDARDS: EXPLANATION
AND ANALYSIS 354-60 (1980); Note, IRS Access to TaxAccrual Workpapers: Legal Considerations and Policy Concerns,
51 FoRDHAm L. REa. 468, 469-70 (1982).
30. Nath, Internal Revenue Service Summonses for "Sensitive' Accountants' Papers, 34 VAND. L. REv. 1561,
1566 (1981).
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Before investigating the corporation's financial statements, the auditor, or audit-
ing firm, prepares an audit workplan-a detailed "master plan" that enumerates the
"procedures to be followed.., with a 'check-off method of confirming that such
procedures were followed, together with suggestions for future modifications of the
plan.''31 Because the auditor does not verify every item in the client's records, the
auditor must predetermine which, and to what extent, items and records will be
examined. 32 Thus, the audit workplan has been described as the auditor's "game
plan." 3
3
The audit workpapers,34 developed and owned by the auditor and upon which
the auditor bases his or her opinion, can be classified into two categories. 35 The first
consists of reports to management, which "evaluate whether the corporation's
accounting systems, procedures, and controls are adequate and accurate.", 36 The
auditor might, for example, investigate and recommend improvements in the system
of accounting for bad debts or of taking inventory. 37 The second consists of tax
accrual workpapers, 38 which are prepared by the auditor as he attempts to determine
whether the client has set aside sufficient reserves to cover any potential tax liability
the client may be required to pay. 39 Because "income tax liability is a material factor
in computing a corporation's net income," 40 an auditor must determine whether the
31. United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 550 F.2d 615, 617 (10th Cir. 1977).
32. Brief for Respondent-Appellant Arthur Young & Co. at 6-7, United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d
211 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1180 (1983).
Auditors consider their audit workplan highly confidential because it is individually tailored to effectively examine
each client and used each year with specific improvements. If the client were made aware of the audit workplan he could
defeat its effectiveness. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 496 F. Supp. 1152, 1157 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), res'd, 677
F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1180 (1983); see Note, Government Access to Corporate Documents,
supra note 2, at 356-57. However, an audit work program does not long remain a secret. Because of reuse, the basic
aspects of the program are revealed to the client. Furthermore, the movement of accountants between independent
accounting firms and corporate accounting departments facilitates access to much information. Note, Protecting the
Auditor's Work Product from the IRS, 1982 DuKE L.J. 604, 613.
33. Nath, supra note 30, at 1567.
34. The term is defined more narrowly in this Comment than in the Internal Revenue Manual. The latter defines
audit workpapers as "workpapers retained by the independent accountant as to the procedures followed, the tests
performed, the information obtained, and the conclusions reached .... [1 Audit] I.R.M. (CCH) § 4024.2 (rev. May
14, 1981).
35. Audit workpapers might be classified two different ways, but the difference may reflect little more than the
desired conclusions. If the division is between (1) the financial data extracted from the taxpayer's records and (2) the
auditor's opinion and evaluation, the argument that a privilege should protect the auditor's mental processes is feasible.
See generally Garbis & Struntz, The Second Circuit's Arthur Young Decision: A Privilege for Tax Accrual Workpapers,
57 J. TAX'N 66, 69-70 (1982). If one divides audit workpapers into (1) the auditor's reports to management, and (2) tax
pool analysis, he intimates the indivisibility of fact and opinion within the tax accrual workpapers. See Nath, supra note
30, at 1567, 1572 (categorizing workpapers in this manner).
36. Nath, supra note 30, at 1568.
37. Id.
38. Tax accrual workpapers have been referred to as tax pool analysis, tax reserve memoranda, tax reserve papers,
tax contingency files, tax provision memoranda, and "documents analyzing potential tax liabilities or tax problems."
United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 1982), petitionfor cert.filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3342 (U.S. Oct. 22,
1982) (No. 82-716). See generally Caplin, Should the Service Be Permitted to Reach Accountants' Tax Accrual Workpap-
ers?, 51 J. TAX'N 194, 194 (1979).
39. United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 534 (5th Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3342
(U.S. Oct. 22, 1982) (No. 82-716); United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 217 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.
granted, 103 S. Ct. 1180 (1983); United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 550 F.2d 615, 617 (10th Cir. 1977).
40. Note, Government Access to Corporate Documents, supra note 2, at 357.
"A business must accrue both actual and potential tax liability as a charge against current earnings in order to reflect
accurately its financial position .... The tax contingency figure is a composite of possible tax consequences, each
discounted by the probability that it will occur." Caplin, Government Access to Independent Accountants' Tax Accrual
Workpapers, 1 VA. TAX Rav. 57, 59 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Caplin, Tax Accrual Workpapers].
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corporation's financial statements accurately reflect the possibility of future govern-
ment challenges before giving an opinion.4 1
When evaluating the adequacy of the client's reserve for contingent tax
liability4 2 the accountant must examine the client's books and records and interview
corporate management and personnel.43 Candid discussion is vital to the effective
performance of the audit function. 44 To accurately estimate the client's contingent tax
liability the accountant must have access to the "opinions, speculations, and pro-
jections [of] the client's personnel and legal counsel regarding unclear or aggressive
tax positions."- 45 The accountant must be permitted to ask penetrating questions
about transactions of a sensitive nature.46 This process requires that the accountant
serve as a "devil's advocate," raising all issues of potential controversy in the light
most favorable to the IRS.4 7 One corporate client noted that accountants explore
possible tax consequences on a worst-case basis to
(1) identify issues on the Company's federal tax returns which counsel and other tax
compliance personnel think could be subject to challenge in the course of an [IRS] audit
because of differences with the IRS on interpretation of law or characterization of fact; (2)
speculate on the likelihood that the IRS will raise these issues; (3) evaluate whether the
company would litigate the issues raised and estimate its chances of prevailing; (4) review
and evaluate the legal implications of the issues identified; (5) estimate the dollar amounts
for which the Company would be willing to settle each controversy administratively if it
chose not to litigate, and (6) assign a total estimated dollar amount to the aggregate
outcome as to all issues discussed.48
Tax accrual workpapers are simply the memorialization of this process-a record of
the work done and the conclusions reached. The examination and critical analysis
therefore necessarily reflect the auditor's opinion, speculation, and judgment.49
The documentation might be divided into three categories. First, transactional
material is the "collection of raw data relating directly to potential tax issues." 50
Second, the underlying factual information, such as memoranda of interviews, cor-
respondence with management, and possible settlement positions, represents the fruit
of the auditor's search behind the transactional material. 51 The final category is the
41. Nath, supra note 30, at 1571.
42. The reserve "is a liability account on the corporation's books representing an estimate of possible future income
tax assessments arising from a disallowance of deductions or credits previously taken in computing the corporation's tax
liability." Note, Government Access to Corporate Documents, supra note 2, at 357 n.31.
43. Brief for Respondent-Appellant Arthur Young & Co. at 9, United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211
(2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1180 (1983).
44. Id.
45. Caplin, Tax Accrual Work-papers, supra note 40, at 59-60.
46. Nath, supra note 30, at 1571.
47. Brief for Respondent-Appellant Arthur Young & Co. at 10, United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211
(2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1180 (1983).
48. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit at 4, United States v.
El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3342 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1982) (No. 82-716).
49. Brief for Respondent-Appellant Arthur Young& Co. at 10, United States v. Arthur Young& Co., 677 F.2d 211
(2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1180 (1983).
50. Garbis & Struntz, The Second Circuit's Arthur Young Decision: A Privilege for Tax Accrual Workpapers, 57 J.
TAX'N 66, 70 (1982).
51. Id.
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auditor's analysis-his cumulative judgment based on the facts and the law as he
understands them.52 While the client's financial statement identifies the total amount
of potential tax liability, it does not break down the figure on an "item-by-item"
basis, as do the tax accrual workpapers.53 This, then, is why such workpapers are
considered a "definitive road map to the vulnerable areas in a corporate taxpayer's
return."
54
Tax accrual workpapers are not prepared to assist in filling out a tax return or
"to respond to a specific charge by the IRS or to any pending or impending lawsuit.
[Rather, they are] undertaken solely to ensure that the corporation sets aside on its
balance sheet a sufficient amount to cover contingent tax liability." 55 Frequently the
accountant's independence and conservatism will conflict with the client's "desire to
maximize the report of earnings. -56 Thus, the tax accrual workpapers reflect the
auditor's determinations, not those of the client.
In summary, tax accrual workpapers (1) are a memorialization (2) of the au-
ditor's investigation and mental processes in determining, (3) for financial reporting
purposes, (4) the adequacy of the client's reserve for contingent tax liability, (5) by
reviewing the tax laws and (6) the client's books and records, and (7) by discussing
the general affairs of the business with management, employees, and the clients of
the auditor's client.
III. PROTECTING AN INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANT'S TAX ACCRUAL
WORKPAPERS
A. Relevance of Tax Accrual Workpapers to an IRS Investigation
In United States v. Powell57 the Supreme Court stated the test for judicial
enforcement of a section 7602 summons. The Commissioner must show58 "that the
investigation will be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that the inquiry may
be relevant to the purpose, that the information sought is not already within the
Commissioner's possession, and that the administrative steps required by the Code
have been followed . . ... 59 Once the Commissioner has made the initial showing
52. Id.
53. See Caplin, Tax Accrual Workpapers, supra note 40, at 61.
54. Id.
55. United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 535 (5th Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3342
(U.S. Oct. 22, 1982) (No. 82-716).
56. Nath, supra note 30, at 1571.
57. 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
58. The government must make a prima facie showing, but the burden of proof is considered minimal. It does not
require that probable cause be established. Id. at 57; see United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 536 (5th Cir. 1982),
petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3342 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1982) (No. 82-716); United States v. Silvestain, 668 F.2d 1161,
1163 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v. Kis, 658 F.2d 526, 536 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1018 (1982);
United States v. Garden State Nat'l Bank, 607 F.2d 61, 71 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474
F. Supp. 322, 330 (D. Mass.), appeal dismissed, 612 F.2d 569 (1st Cir. 1979), appeal of one party dismissed as moor,
623 F.2d 720 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021, affd as to second party, 623 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1980).
59. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964).
The IRS may not use a § 7602 summons in a criminal investigation. United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S.
298, 314-16 (1978). Yet rarely are the civil and criminal aspects of an investigation wholly divorced, and the burden is on
the summonee to disprove a civil tax determination purpose. Id. at 316.
The "in possession" requirement has been literally construed by the courts, thus rejecting the accounting pro-
fession's argument that because the Service has all the records of transactions they constructively have "possession" of
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the taxpayer is entitled to "challenge the summons on any appropriate ground," 60 but
the burden is on the taxpayer to establish that enforcement of the summons would be
an abuse of the court's process.
6 1
Although accountants (who are frequently the focus of an IRS summons) might
allege the failure to fulfill a number of Powell elements, they most frequently attack
summonses for demanding documents that are not relevant to the Service's inquiry. 62
In United States v. Coopers & Lybrand63 the accounting firm argued, and the Tenth
Circuit agreed, that the documents were not subject to production under an IRS
summons because they were not relevant to determining the correctness of a tax
return or the amount of tax liability. 64 In contrast, the Second Circuit in United States
v. Arthur Young & Co. 65 concluded that tax accrual workpapers were very relevant
and would otherwise be available to the IRS were it not for countervailing policy
considerations requiring work product protection for the documents.66 In United
States v. El Paso Co. 67 the Fifth Circuit wholly agreed with the Arthur Young court's
understanding of relevance and ordered the taxpayer's in-house accountant to turn
over the tax accrual workpapers. 68 The El Paso court, however, did not discuss the
issue of an accountant work product protection "because the IRS ... summoned the
tax pool analysis from the taxpayer itself, not from an independent accountant. ,'69
The definition of relevance, grappled with in post-Coopers & Lybrand litiga-
tion, has proved to be an elusive concept.7 0 Limited legislative history on the matter
has forced the courts to define the scope of section 7602 without the help of Con-
gress.71 United States v. Powell,72 although helpful, has likewise failed to provide
adequate guidance. The relevance issue has been further confused by the use of
descriptive, yet conclusory language.73
the information in the tax accrual workpapers. E.g., United States v. Noall, 587 F.2d 123, 125 n.2 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979). See generally Nath, supra note 30, at 1574 n.53; Note, IRS Access to Tax Accrual
Workpapers: Legal Considerations and Policy Concerns, 51 FORDHAM L. REv. 468, 473 n.30 (1982).
60. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964).
61. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58 (1964).
62. Nath, supra note 30, at 1574-75.
63. 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977).
64. Id. at 621.
65. 677 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1180 (1983).
66. Id. at 219.
67. 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3342 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1982) (No. 82-716).
68. Id. at 537, 545.
69. Id. at 537 n.7.
70. Referring to the relevancy concept, one recent commentator noted that although various courts "tested the same
concept against the same standard, their respective resolutions of the question are at opposite poles. This exceedingly
malleable standard offers little guidance or predictability." Note, A Balancing Approach to the Discoverability of
Accountants' Tax Liability Workpapers Under Section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 185, 203
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, A Balancing Approach]. The standard of relevance, as presently articulated, may fall
anywhere in a broad range. While the IRS need not make a showing of probable cause, it must do more than show that
"some chance of relevance exists." United States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520, 524 (2d Cir. 1968).
71. The final committee report on the present version of § 7602 simply stated, "This section contains no material
change from existing law." H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A436, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CoNo. & AD.
NEws 4025, 4584. The then existing law provided a summons authority "to examine any books, papers, records, or
memoranda bearing upon the matters required to be included in the return." Act of Feb. 24, 1919, ch. 18, § 1305, 40 Stat.
1057, 1142.
72. 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
73. A court attempting to determine the proper test of relevance is not significantly aided by the knowledge that the
IRS may have access to a document that "might throw light upon the correctness of the return," United States v.
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Two approaches for determining relevance have developed: the balancing
approach, alluded to by the Tenth Circuit in Coopers & Lybrand, and the "throw
light upon" approach, first described in Foster v. United States by the Second
Circuit. 74 Adherents of the balancing approach argue that "[rielevancy is inherently a
balancing concept such that the courts must weigh the variables in each case on an ad
hoc basis." 75 In Coopers & Lybrand the Tenth Circuit enumerated several variables
to be considered: (1) whether the taxpayer is merely attempting to frustrate or prevent
an IRS inquiry into potential tax liability, (2) whether the summons places an un-
necessary burden on the taxpayer, (3) whether the IRS had some indication prior to
the audit that the taxpayer was purposely attempting to escape tax liability, (4)
whether the summons is "overbroad and disproportionate to the end sought," (5)
whether the summons is directed at the taxpayer or a third party (generally an
independent auditor), and (6) whether the purpose of the summons is to conduct a
"rambling exploration" or "fishing expedition" for the convenience of the IRS.76
Recent commentators have both supported a balancing test and proposed other ele-
ments that might be considered.77 Most courts, however, have been unpersuaded and
have rejected the Coopers & Lybrand approach.78
The "throw light upon" approach, though not well defined, may be outlined as
follows. Section 7602 is evidence of a congressional desire to grant the IRS broad
authority with which to effectively enforce the revenue laws. 79 To effectuate this
desire, a low-threshold test of relevance, like that used by grand juries, is considered
appropriate. The frequently accepted test has been "whether the documents requested
'might have thrown light upon' the correctness of a return." 80 Courts have noted that
Harrington, 388 F.2d 520, 524 (2d Cir. 1968), but that the IRS may not go on a "fishing expedition" or a "rambling
exploration" for the "mere sake of its convenience," United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 550 F.2d 615,621 (10th Cir.
1977).
74. 265 F.2d 183, 187 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959). It is arguable that only one approach exists and
that the various courts differ on which factors they will consider when determining relevance.
75. Note, A Balancing Approach, supra note 70, at 203 (footnotes omitted).
76. 550 F.2d 615, 621 (10th Cir. 1977).
77. Caplin, Tax Accrual Workpapers, supra note 40, at 64-68; Note, A Balancing Approach, supra note 70; Note,
Government Access to Corporate Documents, supra note 2, at 381-82.
78. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1180 (1983);
United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3342 (U.S. Oct. 22,
1982) (No. 82-716); United States v. Noall, 587 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1978) (taxpayer's internal audit reports and related
documents were relevant because they might throw light upon the correctness of the taxpayer's return and were, therefore,
summonable by the IRS), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979); United States v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 515 F. Supp. 997
(N.D. Ill. 1981) (IRS granted access to an independent accountant's tax accrual workpapers because the IRS satisfied the
four Powell tests, including relevance); United States v. Riley Co., 45 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 80-551 (N.D. 111. 1980)
(independent accounting firm ordered to produce various reports to management because the IRS had satisfied the Powell
requirements); United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322 (D. Mass.) (independent accountant's tax
accrual workpapers are summonable because they are nonprivileged and highly relevant), appeal dismissed, 612 F.2d 569
(1st Cir. 1979), appeal of one party dismissed as moot, 623 F.2d 720 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021, affd as to
second party, 623 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. First Chicago Corp., 43 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 79-426 (N.D.
11. 1978) (after in camera inspection the taxpayer was ordered to produce eight of twenty-three internal audit reports
because of their relevance to an IRS audit).
79. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1180 (1983);
see also United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 711 (1980).
80. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1180 (1983);
United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 537 (5th Cir. 1982), petition for cert.filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3342 (U.S. Oct. 22,
1982) (No. 82-716).
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it is "hard to imagine a document more likely to shed light on the correctness of those
aspects of a return that harbor doubts than the tax pool analysis."81
"A thing is ELEvA1,r when it has a connection, [especially] a logical connection,
with a matter under consideration. "82 The application of the "throw light upon" test
to this general definition might be stated as follows: Relevance will be found when
the workpapers (the thing) might83 throw light upon (a minimal connection) the
correctness of a return (the matter under consideration). Once the required minimal
connection is established the relevance requirement is satisfied, regardless of other
considerations. Policy concerns, like those enumerated in the Coopers & Lybrand
decision, 84 may lead a court to protect an auditor's tax accrual workpapers, but they
do not increase or decrease the relevance of tax accrual workpapers to determining
the correctness of a return. For example, a taxpayer's desire or attempt to frustrate an
IRS investigation does not affect the relevance of the tax accrual workpapers to the
determination of tax liability. Likewise, the logical connection between the docu-
ments and determining the correctness of the return should not be affected by whether
IRS possession of the documents simplifies the Service's procedure. 85 Tax accrual
workpapers may be relevant to determining the correctness of a return and yet make
the audit either more difficult or simpler to perform. Seeking tax accrual workpapers
because they make an IRS audit more convenient does not make the workpapers less
relevant. 8
6
Because relevance inherently refers to a relationship or connection between
facts, a given document's relevance ultimately turns upon the facts of the particular
case. Thus, a document may be relevant in one context, but irrelevant in another.87
81. United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 537 (5th Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3342
(U.S. Oct. 22, 1982) (No. 82-716).
82. WEasrR's THIRD NEw INTERNATONAL DICnONARY 1917 (1970) (emphasis in original). "[One] [flact is
relevant to another fact when, according to [the] common course of events, existence of one taken alone or in connection
with the other fact renders existence of the other certain or more probable." BLACK's LAW DCTIONARY 1160 (5th ed.
1979).
83. "Might" requires "in the particular circumstance an indication of a realistic expectation rather than an idle hope
that something may be discovered." United States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520, 524 (2d Cir. 1968).
84. See supra text accompanying note 76.
85. Nath, supra note 30, at 1586.
86. One commentator recently suggested that courts are applying a standard of relevancy different from the "throw
light upon" standard. Supposedly, "convenience is being viewed as sufficient to establish relevance." Note, IRS Access
to Tax Accrual Workpapers: Legal Considerations and Policy Concerns, 51 FORDHAM L. REv. 468, 477-78 (1982). The
Second and Fifth Circuits did not rely on the convenience factor to establish relevance. Rather, they recognized that
convenience does not indicate irrelevance. United States v. El Paso, 682 F.2d 530, 537-38 (5th Cir. 1982), petition for
cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3342 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1982) (No. 82-716); United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211,
219 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1180 (1983).
Another writer admitted that "the auditor's workpapers do shed some light on the taxpayer's tax positions," but
argued that because the workpapers reflect upon the taxpayer's tax position "only indirectly" they should be considered
"little more than a convenience to the IRS." Note, Protecting the Auditor's Work Productfrom the IRS, 1982 Dunca L.J.
604, 618. The author correctly recognized, first, that a logical connection exists between the workpapers and determining
the correctness of a return so that the papers may pass the legal test of relevance and second, that convenience may be the
Service's dominant purpose for summoning tax accrual workpapers. The recommended solution is a change in the Powell
relevance test. Id. at 620. Because this author's attack focuses on the Service's purpose for summoning the workpapers,
however, the argument for change applies most clearly to the first prong of the Powell test. See supra text accompanying
note 59.
87. Caplin, Tax Accrual Workpapers, supra note 40, at 65.
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Relevance may also exist in varying degrees based on the circumstances of a particu-
lar case,88 but the elements outlined by the Coopers & Lybrand court do not indicate
relevance.
Perhaps a more effective argument would be that these considerations in some
way affect one of the other prongs of the Powell test.89 The first prong of the test
requires the IRS to "show that the investigation will be conducted pursuant to a
legitimate purpose . "9...  While determining tax liability or the correctness of a
taxpayer's return is clearly a legitimate purpose, every means of performing an
inquiry is not thereby authorized or condoned. Determining whether a purpose is
"legitimate" may more properly involve the balancing test employed by the Tenth
Circuit. 9 ' IRS summonses seeking the legal opinions and theories of an outside agent
when the IRS has all the raw data, simply for the sake of convenience, may be
considered illegitimate by a court.
Judge Garwood, in his El Paso dissent, attacked the majority's "throw light
upon" approach.92 He argued that when Congress enacted section 7602 to require
that books, papers, records, and other data be relevant to "such inquiry," the legisla-
ture meant that the various items must be relevant to "the correctness of any return"
or "liability of any person" not simply relevant to "ascertaining" or "determining"
correctness or liability.9 3 The workpapers must be relevant to the subject matter of the
inquiry rather than merely to the inquiry itself.
This attempt to find a prohibition on the use of information relevant to determin-
ing the correctness of a return in the wording of section 7602 is unpersuasive. First,
"inquiry" connotes investigation, search, probe, or quest, all of which involve
process. Nothing in section 7602 indicates a different interpretation. 94 Second, since
section 7602 permits the IRS access to documents and data for use in "making a
return where none has been made" it is illogical to preclude documents relevant to
ascertaining the tax liability of a person. 95 If the Service were granted access only to
documents used in the preparation of an existing tax return, it could never fulfill the
function of making out a return when none has been previously made, because no
documents would exist.
In his second, and potentially more important argument, Judge Garwood in-
dicated that the "throw light upon" test should mean and actually has meant "throw
factual light upon.", 96 Garwood felt that the Second Circuit's attempt to protect
outside accountants' tax accrual workpapers could be better accomplished by nar-
rowly construing section 7602 and restricting relevance to factual information.
97
88. Id. at 64.
89. See supra text accompanying note 59.
90. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57 (1964).
91. See supra text accompanying note 76.
92. 682 F.2d 530, 547-49 (5th Cir. 1982) (Garwood, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 546-47.
94. See supra note 3.
95. Nath, supra note 30, at 1578.
96. 682 F.2d 530, 546, 547-49 (5th Cir. 1982) (Garwood, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
97. Narrow construction of § 7602 might be supported as follows: I.R.C. § 7605(b), while limited by the Powell
decision, states that -[n]o taxpayer shall be subjected to unnecessary examination or investigations ... ." I.R.C. §
[Vol. 44:743
1983] PROTECTING AN ACCOUNTANTS WORKPAPERS 753
This proposal likewise suffers from a number of problems. Distinguishing fac-
tual information from personal viewpoints and interpretations is frequently impos-
sible. Factual information can be sheltered amidst impressions, opinions, and theor-
ies. In addition, some mental impressions, opinions, and theories might be protected
under this approach even though countervailing considerations warranting protection
are lacking.
B. Express Statutory Prohibitions
In United States v. Euge the Supreme Court noted that the Service's con-
gressionally mandated summons authority "should be upheld absent express statu-
tory prohibition .... " 98 Yet no express language in section 760299 or in the secur-
ities laws prohibits the IRS from summoning an accountant's tax accrual work-
papers.10 0 If an express statutory limitation on the Service's summons authority were
the only means of protecting an accountant's workpapers, congressional action would
be required.' ° ' The Supreme Court, however, has established other standards for
protecting an accountant's tax accrual workpapers.
C. Traditional Privileges and Limitations
In Couch v. United States10 2 the Supreme Court announced that "no con-
fidential accountant-client privilege exists under federal law, and no state-created
privilege has been recognized in federal cases."103 Accountants litigating IRS access
to tax accrual workpapers, and the accounting profession generally, thereafter aban-
doned the privilege argument'0 4 and instead asserted that substantial policy factors
7605(b) (1982). Mental impressions, legal analyses, conclusions, and recommendations are no more than personal
viewpoints. If permitted access to all factual records and data, the IRS can perform all the investigations and calculations
necessary for determining one's tax liability or the correctness of a taxpayer's return. Restricting relevance to factual
information minimizes the already intrusive and abusive nature of our tax collecting system.
98. United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 711 (1980). Throughout the opinion the Court notes at least four
standards with gradually decreasing need for congressional mandate and increasing importance of policy considerations.
The standards are as follows: (1) "express statutory prohibition," (2) "contrary legislative purposes," (3) "countervail-
ing policies enunciated by Congress," and (4) "substantial countervailing policies." Id. at 711, 716.
99. See supra note 3.
100. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 221-22 (2d Cir. 1982) (Newman, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1180 (1983). The Arthur Young dissenter noted that the majority did not
find "anything in the text or legislative history of § 7602 to support an exception of an accountant's tax accrual
workpapers." Id.
101. A recent Note argued that § 7602 should be amended to protect accountants' tax accrual workpapers by limiting
access to some third party documents. Note, Protecting the Auditor's Work Product from the IRS, 1982 DUKE L.J. 604,
626. Supposedly judicial change is too slow to remedy any dispute. Id. Yet, as the dissenter in Arthur Young noted,
Congress has been aware of the controversy since at least 1979, when United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F.
Supp. 322 (D. Mass.), appeal dismissed, 612 F.2d 569 (Ist Cir. 1979), appeal of one party dismissed as moot, 623 F.2d
720 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021, affdas to second party, 623 F.2d 725 (Ist Cir. 1980), was decided, but has
failed to take action. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 222 (2d Cir. 1982) (Newman, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1180 (1983). See also Note, Government Access to Corporate
Documents, supra note 2, at 388, suggesting a statutorily created auditor-client testimonial privilege along the lines of the
newspaper-source privilege proposed in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 743 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
102. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
103. Id. at 335.
104. One critic has argued that "the accountants' objective clearly is the recognition of what amounts to an
accountant-client privilege by some other name ... [and] that their goal is a variation on the work product doctrine that is
less than a privilege, but which only a showing of substantial need-such as the likely presence of fraud--can overcome."
Nath, supra note 30, at 1599 n.159.
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require that the tax accrual workpapers not be produced.' 05 Yet, as noted above, the
Supreme Court recently enumerated three restrictions that may limit the scope of a
section 7602 summons' 0 6 and included "traditional privileges and limitations"' 1 7 as
the second of these. In Upjohn Co. v. United States10 8 the Court identified the work
product doctrine and the attorney-client privilege as the types of traditional limita-
tions that would restrict the Service's summons authority.' 0 9
Citing to these Supreme Court decisions, the Second Circuit fashioned a type of
work product protection for an independent accountant's tax accrual workpapers. In
United States v. Arthur Young & Co."1° the Second Circuit rejected the accountant's
lack of relevance argument, yet refused to compel production of the documents. As
the court stated, "the countervailing policies at issue ... require us to fashion pro-
tection for the work that independent auditors, retained by publicly owned companies
to comply with the federal securities laws, put into preparation of tax accrual work-
papers."' Chief Judge Feinberg created the work product protection, citing United
States v. Euge,112 in which the Supreme Court noted that "contrary legislative
purposes" can undercut the "broad latitude" granted to the IRS,' 13 and Upjohn Co.
v. United States,114 which recognized that common-law privileges serve to limit the
scope of the IRS' summons power. 115 The Second Circuit fashioned its protection
around the work product doctrine enunciated by the Supreme Court in Hickman v.
Taylor." 6 The Arthur Young court indicated that whenever "strong public policies"
outweigh a "party's need for information," Hickman requires a court to apply a
balancing approach. 117 The court accepted the accounting firm's argument that com-
plete disclosure by the client is necessary for "the maintenance of fair and honest
markets in [securities] transactions. "118 Shielding the "written statement, private
memoranda and personal recollections" memorialized in an accountant's tax accrual
workpapers is necessary to assure complete candor in the accountant-client
relationship. 1 9 Thus, the tax accrual workpapers, which would save the IRS time
105. Brief for Respondent-Appellant Arthur Young & Co. at 33, United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d
211 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1180 (1983). The taxpayer in El Paso argued that the summons should not be
enforced -[a]s a matter of public policy." Brief of Appellant at 48, United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir.
1982), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3342 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1982) (No. 82-716).
106. United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707 (1980); see supra text accompanying notes 15-18.
107. United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 714 (1980).
108. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
109. Id. at 397-98, 389-97.
110. 677 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1180 (1983).
111. Id. at 219. This statement defines the privilege created by the court and delineates its requirements. A careful
reading of the decision will indicate that the holding is extremely narrow. The court explained that it was compelled to
create a privilege only because of "the countervailing policies at issue in the case before us." Id. (emphasis added).
112. 444 U.S. 707 (1980).
113. Id. at 716 & n.9.
114. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
115. Id. at 397-98.
116. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
117. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 219 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1180
(1983).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 219-20.
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and effort by serving as a road map through the taxpayer's return, are not important
enough to justify jeopardizing the reliability of the data on which the investing public
relies.
The Arthur Young reasoning was rejected in United States v. El Paso Co. '20 The
Fifth Circuit ordered the taxpayer's in-house accountants to produce their tax accrual
workpapers in compliance with an IRS summons.121 While the court did not reach the
issue of an accountant work product protection, 12 it did note that "[t]o extend Arthur
Young to this case would, in effect, create an accountant-client communications
privilege," which the court was unwilling to do absent legal precedent. 2 3 The court
further rejected the Arthur Young court's analysis by denying a work product protec-
tion to the tax pool analysis prepared by the taxpayer's attorneys' 24 and by rejecting
the Arthur Young court's policy arguments.' 25
1. Work Product Protection
In Hickman v. Taylor 126 the Supreme Court "recognized a qualified privilege
for certain materials prepared by an attorney 'acting for his client in anticipation of
litigation. "127 The work product doctrine, 128 embodied in Rule 26 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 129 provides a qualified immunity for (1) "documents and
tangible things; (2) prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial; and (3) by or for
another party or by or for that other party's representative."' 130 The strong public
policies underlying the doctrine, recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court,'13 ' are
largely intangible, subtle, and vaguely defined.' 32 A number of arguments have been
given to support the assertion that without the doctrine "[i]nefficiency, unfairness
and sharp practices would inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice and in the
preparation of cases for trial." 133 Without work product protection, "much of what is
now put down in writing would remain unwritten."' 134 The diligent and competent
lawyer might be discouraged "from exerting his fullest efforts to develop his client's
case."1 35 Unlimited discovery might promote a wait-and-see attitude, if not laziness
120. 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3342 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1982) (No. 82-716).
121. Id. at 545.
122. Id. at 537 n.7.
123. Id. at 541.
124. Id. at 542-44.
125. Id. at 544-45.
126. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
127. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 237-38 (1974) (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947)).
128. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 397 (1981). The doctrine has been referred to as a "privilege" or
an "immunity" by courts and commentators alike. This type of reference is confusing, if not misleading. It is more
precisely a protection, or a qualified immunity that may be overcome with an appropriate showing of need. Note,
Discovery: Hickman v. Taylor, A Decade Later, 37 N.D.L. REv. 67, 68 (1961).
129. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
130. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MIt. ER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2024, at 196-97 (1970).
131. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 398 (1981).
132. See Case Comment, The Derivative Use of Attorneys' Opinion Work Product in IRS Summons Enforcement
Proceedings: United States v. Bonnell, 65 MINN. L. REv. 488, 492 n.21 (1981).
133. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
134. Id.
135. Developments in the Lav-Discovery, 74 HARv. L. REV. 940, 1029 (1961).
1983]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
on the part of opposing counsel. 136 Furthermore, clients might be "reluctant to
disclose all facts, favorable and unfavorable to their counsel.",1 37 Other com-
mentators have argued that the protection is necessary to maintain the adversarial
system, that the lawyer has a proprietary interest in his work product-the fruit of his
own labors, and that the doctrine is needed to avoid the freezing of issues prior to
trial.138 Although each of these justifications and the doctrine itself have been at-
tacked by critics, 139 the doctrine serves an important function if it encourages com-
plete preparation for trial and zealous representation of clients. The Supreme Court
recently concluded that the doctrine and the strong underlying policies were sufficient
to allow an attorney's memoranda and a recording of a witness interview to be
protected from an IRS summons.
140
In its petition for a writ of certiorari, the IRS argued that the Arthur Young court
"erroneously extended the work-product doctrine beyond its settled and appropriate
bounds."' 14 1 In Hickman the Supreme Court was concerned with attorneys and mate-
rial prepared in anticipation of litigation-not with accountants' tax accrual workpap-
ers prepared in the course of a regular audit.' 42 Furthermore, so the argument goes,
the purpose of work product protection is not primarily to foster candid com-
munications between parties in a relationship: that, the Service claims, is "the es-
sence of a communications privilege." 143 Thus, one must decide, first, whether an
independent accountant's tax accrual workpapers are the type of documents that
should be protected; second, whether the documents meet the "prepared in anticipa-
tion of litigation" requirement; and third, whether the work product doctrine could
possibly achieve the accounting profession's objective.
The analogy between the material produced by an attorney and the tax account-
ant's tax accrual workpapers is strong. 144 Both are prepared by the professional after
assessing the strengths and weaknesses of a client's position, and both contain the
136. Id.
137. Case Comment, The Derivative Use of Attorneys' Opinion Work Product in IRS Summons Enforcement
Proceedings: United States v. Bonnell, 65 MINN. L. REv. 488, 492 (1981).
138. Comment, The Potential for Discovery of Opinion Work Product Under Rule 26(b)(3), 64 IowA L. REv. 103,
115-16 (1978).
139. For a discussion of the doctrine and the various underlying rationales, see generally Gardner, Agency Problems
in the Law ofAttorney-Client Privilege: Privilege and "Work Product" Under Open Discovery (pt. 2), 42 U. DEr. L.J.
253, 268-82 (1965); Note, Discovery of an Attorney's Work Product in Subsequent Litigation, 1974 DUKE L.J. 799,
808-09; Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REv. 940, 1028-30 (1961); Note, Work Product Discovery:
A Multifactor Approach to the Anticipation of Litigation Requirement in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), 66
IOWA L. REV. 1277, 1280-86 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Work Product Discovery]; Comment, The Potential for
Discovery of Opinion Work Product Under Rule 26(b)(3), 64 IowA L. Rev. 103, 114-16 (1978).
140. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 400, 402 (1981).
141. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit at 10, United States
v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1180 (1983).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 10-11.
144. Arthur Young & Co. sought protection for their audit program and tax accrual workpapers. The subsequent
textual discussion refers to the tax accrual workpapers alone. The district court found that the audit program was not
relevant to determining the correctness of any return and the Service did not appeal this finding. United States v. Arthur
Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 215 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1180 (1983).
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theories and strategies needed to support the client in subsequent litigation.145 The
words of the Hickman Court are applicable in both cases:
Proper preparation of a client's case demands that he assemble information, sift what he
considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan
his strategy .... This work is reflected ... in interviews, statements, memoranda, cor-
respondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and countless other tangible
and intangible ways ... .46
No sure test has been formulated for determining whether documents were
prepared in anticipation of litigation. 147 Courts and commentators have offered such a
variety of formulas for guidance that the result has been general confusion. 14 8 Per-
haps the best approach would be to consider a number of factors 149 to determine
"whether, in light of the nature of the document and the factual situation in the
particular case, the document can fairly be said to have been prepared or obtained
because of the prospect of litigation." 15
The accountants' arguments must focus on the purpose of the "in anticipation of
litigation" requirement. The work product doctrine is intended to promote complete
trial preparation and competent representation.151 If an attorney does not anticipate or
fear discovery of information he has collected for litigation, the manner in which he
prepares for litigation should remain unaffected. 152 On the other hand, if an attorney,
or an accountant, can anticipate that the material he creates will be revealed to the
opposing party prior to litigation, the manner in which he prepares for trial may be
substantially affected. When preparing tax accrual workpapers an accountant must
anticipate litigation, the legal theories that will be relied upon, the probable outcome,
and the settlement figures that would be in the taxpayer's favor.' 5 3 If the Service were
to gain access to this information it would bring two results. First, it would flag the
soft spots on the taxpayer's return, 154 inviting IRS-initiated litigation. Second, it
would inform the Service of the legal theories and the strategies to be used at trial.
Certainly, the effect on the accounting profession would be demoralizing "[a]nd the
interests of the clients and the cause of justice would be poorly served." 155
145. Brief for Respondent-Appellant Arthur Young & Co. at 30, United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d
211 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1180 (1983).
146. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
147. "For example, some courts indicate that a party or its representative anticipates litigation when there is a
'substantial probability' of 'imminent' litigation or when there is a 'prospect' of litigation. Another requirement is that
there be 'some possibility' of litigation; however, a 'mere possibility' of litigation is not enough." Note, Work Product
Discovery, supra note 139, at 1277-78.
148. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1229 (3d Cir. 1979); Kent Corp. v. NLRB, 530 F.2d
612, 623 (5th Cir. 1976).
149. Note, Work Product Discovery, supra note 139, at 1299.
150. 8 C. WRior & A. MrtLER, FEDERAL PRAcncE AND PRoc nutE § 2024, at 198 (1970).
151. Note, Work Product Discovery, supra note 139, at 1288-99.
152. Id. at 1289-90.
153. See supra notes 38-49 and accompanying text.
154. Caplin, Should the Service Be Permitted to Reach Accountants' Tax Accrual Workpapers?, 51 J. TAX'N 194,
194 (1979).
155. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
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The Service could argue that tax accrual workpapers are routinely prepared as
required by the accounting profession and the SEC, with no temporal connection
between the audit and any potential litigation and with no specific event, other than
the annual auditing process, spawning their creation. 156 Thus, the only factor favor-
ing a conclusion that the documents were prepared in anticipation of litigation is that
they contain legal analyses, theories, and mental impressions. 157 If that were not true,
no work product issue would be present.
In a number of respects the work product doctrine, a theory laden with judicial
requirements for its application,15 8 is a helpful and workable framework within which
to protect an independent accountant's tax accrual workpapers. First, an accountant's
work product can be broken down into three categories of documents,' 59 with each
requiring a different showing of need by the Service. Facts would not be protected.
Documents generally prepared by the accountant would be protected, but upon an
IRS showing of "substantial need" and an inability "without undue hardship to
obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means, ' 'l 6° the Service
could gain access to the documents. The last category, an accountant's opinion work
product, would remain "virtually sacrosanct."' 161 Under this type of classification
most relevant information would be available to the IRS. The Service would not be
denied the information necessary to determine the correctness of a return or the
amount of a person's tax liability. 162 The work product doctrine therefore represents a
middle position between full disclosure and complete immunity. 63 It allows the
Service to perform the tax collecting function with increased efficiency, but does not
invade the sanctity of a professional's opinion as expressed in his work product.
Furthermore, application of the doctrine may be considered on a case-by-case basis,
thereby allowing the circumstances of each case to be individually considered. While
this may create additional litigation, it may be more just and may provide taxpayers
with a more favorable view of our taxing and judicial systems. 164
Second, the work product protection is not waived by disclosure to a third party
unless the disclosure "substantially increase[s] the opportunities for potential
adversaries to obtain the information."' 165 Unlike an accountant-client privilege,
156. See generally Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARv. L. REv. 940, 1030 (1961).
157. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
158. Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARv. L. REv. 940, 1030-39 (1961).
159. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
160. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
161. Garbis & Struntz, The Second Circuit's Arthur Young Decision: A Privilege for Tax Accrual Workpapers, 57
J. TAX'N 66, 70 (1982).
162. For example, when a corporation's internal records are destroyed by fire and the memoranda being sought
cannot be construed as "nonfactual," the government would satisfy the showing of need to overcome the work product
protection. See Caplin, Should The Service Be Permitted to Reach Accountants' Tax Accrual Workpapers?, 51 J. TAX'N
194, 199 (1979).
163. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2022, at 188 (1970).
164. In its Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, the taxpayer in El Paso stated that "before any such access is permitted,
we believe that this Court should assess its fairness and its likely effect on our voluntary self-assessment tax system."
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit at 21, United States v. El Paso
Co., 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3342 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1982) (No. 82-716).
165. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. M1ImF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDrURE § 2024, at 210 (1970).
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work product protection would thus allow an accountant to comply with his pro-
fessional responsibilities and the requirements of the securities laws without waiving
the privilege as to potential adversaries.
Last, the requirement that an attorney be exercising legal skill to receive the
protection 166 could be applied beneficially to the accountant serving as auditor. The
accountant would receive no work product protection when involved in "routine
business activities.' ' 167 Work product would be protected, however, if it included
"interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions,
personal beliefs, and countless other tangible and intangible"' 168 items collected and
prepared with an eye towards determining whether the tax accrual reserve will cover
potential losses from anticipated litigation.
Although the work product doctrine in many respects provides a helpful
framework for analysis, it suffers from the problems previously noted. The "in
anticipation of litigation" requirement is not easily stretched to fit the tax accrual
workpaper situation. 169 Although access to the workpapers would assuredly instigate
litigation, and even though the workpapers are an attempt by accountants to anticipate
litigation in which their clients may become involved, the workpapers are not pre-
pared "in connection with litigation, no matter how remotely contemplated." 170 The
Arthur Young court correctly recognized that requiring the accountant to expose "to
the Service appraisals of a taxpayer's weaknesses and settlement positions on au-
dit"' 17 1 is prejudical and substantially unfair to the taxpayer. The work product
doctrine, however, may not be the proper means of remedying the injustice. 172
The work product doctrine was not created to satisfy the objectives that the
Arthur Young court sought to achieve. Denial of the protection would do very little to
discourage complete trial preparation or decrease the quality of legal representation at
trial. Furthermore, the desire to foster "candid communications between client and
accountant for the benefit of the investing public and the enforcement of the securities
laws . . . is the essence of a communications privilege."' 173 The Arthur Young court
correctly decided the issue, but arguably for the wrong reason. The majority recog-
nized the many policy considerations involved and sought to structure a remedy by
intertwining the work product doctrine and the accountant-client privilege. Given the
Supreme Court's recognition that "substantial countervailing policies" may limit the
Service's summons power, it was unnecessary to stretch the work product doctrine
beyond its established form.
166. Developments in the Lan-Discorery, 74 HA'v. L. REV. 940, 1032 (1961).
167. Id. at 1033.
168. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
169. See supra note 147.
170. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit at 10, United States
v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1180 (1983).
171. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 220 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1180
(1983).
172. See infra subparts III (C)(2) and In (D).
173. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit at 1 I, United States
v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1180 (1983).
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2. Accountant-Client Privilege
The most significant interest the Arthur Young court sought to protect was the
free and open exchange of ideas between the outside auditor and the client. 74 Yet
this is the underlying rationale for a confidential communications privilege rather
than for a form of work product protection. 175 The two concepts, though frequently
confused, are clearly distinct.' 7 6 The Supreme Court has noted that the attorney-
client privilege does not extend to or "concern the memoranda, briefs, com-
munications and other writings prepared by counsel for personal use in prosecuting a
client's case; and it is equally unrelated to writings which reflect an attorney's mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories." '177
A privilege is an exemption from the oft-repeated rule that the public has a right
to every man's evidence.' 7 8 Thus, while "the primary assumption [is] that there is a
general duty to give what testimony one is capable of giving,"' 179 Wigmore has
explained that an exception is made when four fundamental conditions exist:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be dis-
closed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relationship by the disclosure of the com-
munications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct
disposal of litigation.180
The purpose of a privilege is the protection of interests and relationships consid-
ered important enough to warrant an incidental encroachment on the efficient ad-
ministration of justice.181 To ensure complete freedom of communication between an
advisor and his client, "the apprehension of compelled disclosure by the ... advisor
174. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 220 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1180
(1983).
175. Id. at 223 n.5.
176. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 n.ll (1974); see supra note 128. Although the work product
doctrine traditionally has been considered an immunity from discovery, some commentators have understood recent
Supreme Court decisions as going "some way toward turning the immunity into a privilege. As such, the 'work product'
doctrine is within Rule 501." 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5423, at 699-700
(1980). Despite this assertion, the Wigmore test for privilege, see infra note 180 and accompanying text, is inappropriate
to the work product doctrine because the protection of a relationship is not the primary purpose of the doctrine.
177. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947).
178. 8 J. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 2291, at 554 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683, 709 (1974).
179. 8 J. WGMoRE, supra note 178, § 2192, at 70.
180. Id. § 2285, at 577 (emphasis in original). Wigmore notes that the absence of any one of these conditions
justifies rejection of the privilege. Id.
181. McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 TEx. L. REv. 447, 447-48 (1938); Katsoris,
Confidential Communications-The Accountants' Dilemma, 35 FoRDHAm L. REv. 51, 53 (1966) (quoting McCormick,
supra).
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must be removed." ' ' Nevertheless, application of the privilege doctrine to account-
ants has been attacked on a number of grounds.
The first argument against creating an accountant-client privilege, and the one
invariably relied upon by the federal courts, focuses on Couch v. United States,
18 3
in which the Supreme Court explicitly refused to recognize an accountant-client
privilege. While the Court clearly stated in dicta that "no confidential accountant-
client privilege exists under federal law," 184 this does not conclude a critical inquiry;
an investigation of what the law should be is not completed simply by determining
what the present law is. '8 5 Since the Couch decision in 1973 the Supreme Court has
heard a number of cases dealing with the law of privilege 86 from which one might
conclude that this area of the law is still evolving. 187 In Trammel v. United States'
88
the Supreme Court indicated that "[tihe Federal Rules of Evidence acknowledge the
authority of the federal courts to continue the evolutionary development of testimo-
nial privileges . . . 'governed by the principles of the common law as they may be
interpreted... in the light of reason and experience.' " 89 The Court continued by
asserting, "Congress manifested an affirmative intention not to freeze the law of
privilege.'
190
A second argument against the recognition of an accountant-client privilege is its
failure to satisfy the requirements of Wigmore's four-part privilege test.19' The first
two requirements are not satisfied, so the argument goes, because confidentiality
between the accountant and the client is neither expected by the parties nor essential
to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relationship.' 92 The Supreme Court
182. 8 1. WiOGtotE, supra note 178, § 2291, at 545. One commentator asserted that the Arthur Young court created
a so-called work product privilege "to ensure the vindication of an important public policy, the integrity of the market-
place." rather than to protect "the relationship between accountant and client." Note, IRS Access to Tax Accrual
Workpapers: Legal Considerations and Policy Concerns, 51 FOR HAm L. REv. 468, 487 (1982). It is the impairment of
the accountant-client relationship, however, that threatens the measure of reliance a securities investor may place on an
accountant's opinion to the certified financials.
183. 409 U.S. 322 (1973). Courts frequently cite to Couch to reject any accountant-client privilege without further
consideration. See, e.g., In re International Horizons, Inc., 689 F.2d 996. 1004 (11 th Cir. 1982); United States v. El Paso
Co., 682 F.2d 530, 540 (5th Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3342 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1982) (No. 82-716).
184. 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973).
185. "When precedent and precedent alone is all the argument that can be made to support a court-fashioned rule, it
is time for the rule's creator to destroy it." Francis v. Southern Pacific Co., 333 U.S. 445, 471 (1948) (dissenting
opinion).
186. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
187. Brief for Respondent-Appellant Arthur Young & Co. at 39-40 n.36, United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677
F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1180 (1983).
188. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
189. Id. at 47 (quoting FED. R. EvID. 501).
190. Id. Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence can be viewed as a two-part test. The first component is static
and requires a court to determine how an issue would have been resolved at common law. The second component-
interpretation in light of reason and experience-is a dynamic concept, permitting change in the law of privilege. 23
C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5425, at 704-05 (1980).
191. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
192. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit at 12-13, United
States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1180 (1983).
Louisell attacks Wigmore's four-part test as it applies to attorneys and asserts that the privilege is valuable, not to
ensure that the attorney gets all essential information, but to avoid the unhealthy moral state that compelled disclosure of a
client's confidence creates in the practitioners. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal
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recognized that "there can be little expectation of privacy where records are handed
to an accountant, knowing that mandatory disclosure of much of the information
therein is required in an income tax return." 1 93 Accountants occasionally must reveal
their workpapers to demonstrate that they have properly discharged their duty. 194 The
relationship between accountant and client is not damaged by the lack of privilege,
because the client has "an independent legal duty to make the disclosures ...
without reference to or encouragement by any privilege." 95
The response to this argument is threefold. First, the information contained in
tax accrual workpapers is not required in an income tax return, nor is the information
compiled to assist in preparing the tax return. 196 Second, the accounting profession's
Code of Professional Ethics requires that "[a] member shall not disclose any con-
fidential information obtained in the course of a professional engagement except with
the consent of the client." 197 Even the IRS recognizes that the opinions and theories
found in tax accrual workpapers are conveyed to the independent accountant in
confidence.' 98 Third, the argument that the IRS should be permitted access to the tax
accrual workpapers because the client and accountant should have expected IRS
access would support granting the privilege in at least the Second and Tenth Circuits,
where a realistic expectation of confidentiality may exist since the IRS has been
denied access to the accountants' tax accrual workpapers in the Arthur Young and
Coopers & Lybrand cases. Moreover, this argument that no privilege should be
granted because the confidentiality requirement is violated by the expectation of IRS
access, but that IRS access is allowed absent a privilege, is circular and begs the
judicial question. Last, in situations in which the information is not collected with an
eye towards filling out the tax return and in which the accountant's Code of Pro-
fessional Ethics requires confidentiality, one could fairly conclude that the vast
majority of the communications with which the accountants are concerned do origin-
ate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed.
Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REv. 101, 109-15 (1956). As support, he quotes the following passage from Wigmore:
"'Certainly the position of the ... adviser would be a difficult and disagreeable one; for it must be repugnant to any
honorable man to feel that the confidences which his relation naturally invites are liable at the opponent's behest to be laid
open through his own testimony."' Id. at 112 (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 178, § 2291, at 553). While Louisell's
attack calls into question the evaluation of a potentially original privilege by Wigmorean standards, it supports the creation
of an accountant-client privilege. Louisell states:
[Iln the long run insistence upon precise analysis of the reason for privileged communications, and close inquiry
into the true nature and psychological, social, historical and moral importance to human freedom of claims to
privilege, will best separate the genuine from the spurious. Conversely, it is the hodge-podge treatment of all the
privileges . . . that conduces toward making all privilege a mere matter of professional jealousy and conten-
tion ....
Id. at 114-15.
193. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973).
194. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit at 12, United States
v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1180 (1983).
195. Id. at 13. The second Wigmore requirement is intimately related to the fourth requirement. Whether con-
fidentiality is essential to a relationship will largely turn upon whether the benefit gained by the IRS auditing process
outweighs the possible reduction of corporate cooperation with the outside accountant.
196. Caplin, Tax Accrual Workpapers, supra note 40, at 69; see supra note 55 and accompanying text.
197. AICPA Rules of Conduct, Rule 301, 2 AICPA, PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS (CCH) § 301.01 (1980).
198. [1 Audit] I.R.M. (CCH) § 4233 (232.8(4)) (rev. May 14, 1981).
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The IRS argument that confidentiality is not "essential to the full and satis-
factory maintenance" of the accountant-client relationship1 99 is troublesome. The
Service argues that confidentiality is not necessary because obligations placed upon
both the corporation and the accountants by the securities laws compel disclosure.
The accounting profession, however, can point to the actual harm that has already
resulted from the uncertainty caused by disparate lower court decisions.2 ° ° Further-
more, even the Service recognizes the need for confidentiality between the account-
ant and its corporate client.2 °1 It is only for itself that the Service would like to
penetrate the barrier of confidentiality. Thus, the first two elements of Wigmore's
test2°2 support an accountant-client privilege.
Wigmore's third requirement is also quite easily satisfied; a number of con-
siderations indicate that the accountant-client privilege is one "which in the opinion
of the community ought to be sedulously fostered." 20 3 The accounting profession has
grown at a remarkable rate204 because of an ever increasing demand by lending
institutions, investors, and government agencies for financial analysis and
assistance.20 5 One commentator considered the "increasing reliance by the general
public on the services of the public accountants ' 20 6 sufficient evidence to satisfy
Wigmore's third requirement. 20 7 Additionally, fifteen states have considered the
issue and determined that a confidential relationship with accountants is desirable,
necessary, and entitled to the protection of an accountant-client privilege.20 8
A more difficult question is whether the community would foster the relation-
ship of accountant and client at the expense of IRS efficiency in the auditing process.
The Service questions, and most of the litigation implicitly revolves around, whether
Wigmore's fourth requirement is met-whether "[tihe injury that would inure to the
relationship by the disclosure of the communications . . .[is] greater than the benefit
thereby gained' 209 in the administration of justice or the efficient collection of the
199. 8 J. Witos.toa, supra note 178, § 2285, at 577.
200. See Hanson & Brown, CPAs' Workpapers: The IRS Zeros In, J. Accr., July 1981, at 68.
201. See infra text accompanying notes 212-13.
202. See supra text accompanying note 180.
203. 8 J. WIGiORE, supra note 178, § 2285, at 577.
204. Katsoris, Confidential Communications-The Accountants' Dilemma, 35 FORDHAM L. REv. 51, 52 (1966).
205. See id.; see also National Conference of Lawyers and CPAs, Lantyers and Certified Public Accountants: A
Study oflnterprofessional Relations, 36 TAX LAw. 26 (1982). There are approximately 192,000 CPAs in the United
States employed in public practice, corporate employment, government, and teaching. "The information which account-
ing provides is essential for (1) effective planning, control, and decision making by management, and (2) discharging the
accountability of organizations to investors, creditors, government agencies, taxing authorities, association members,
contributors to welfare institutions, and others." Id. at 28.
206. Note, Evidence-Privileged Communications-Accountant and Client, 46 N.C.L. REV. 419, 423 (1968).
207. See supra text accompanying note 180.
208. ARiZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-749 (1976); COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-90-107 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 473.316
(West 1982); GA. CODE § 42-3-32(b) (1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110-1/2 § 51 (Smith-Hurd 1966); IND. CODE
§ 25-2-1-23 (1974); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 325.440 (Bobbs-Merrill 1969); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37.85 (Vest 1974);
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-110 (1974); MicH. Comsp. LAWs. ANN. § 339.713 (Supp. 1983-1984); Mo.
REv. STAT. § 326.151 (Supp. 1975); NEv. REv. STAT. § 49.195 (1971); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-6(c) (1973); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 63, § 9.1 Ia (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984); TEEN. CODE ANN. § 62-1-116 (1982); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 20, § 790
(1961). For a general discussion and analysis of the various state-created accountant-client privileges, see Note, Govern-
ment Access to Corporate Documents, supra note 2, at 369-73.
209. 8 J. WitmoRE, supra note 178, § 2285, at 577; see supra text accompanying note 180.
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revenues. The accounting profession asserts that the threat of IRS access to an
accountant's tax accrual workpapers has had a substantial negative impact on the
auditing process.21° The profession has "seen a drying up of the willingness of
clients to discuss or even show data to their auditor. And the bottom line is that [this
is not] leading to good financial reporting[;] . . auditors aren't receiving informa-
tion to do proper audits, and that will lead to more qualified opinions."-211 IRS
Commissioner Egger noted that IRS attempts to review tax accrual workpapers were
"driving a wedge between CPA's and their clients." 2 12 Former Commissioner Cap-
lin stated that "[c]andid communication between accountant and client is at stake, as
well as protection of the integrity of the financial audit process and the public interest
in full disclosure in corporate financial statements. "213 These concerns were also at
the heart of the Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Arthur Young & Co.2 14
The Arthur Young court supported the accountants-providing the underlying
rationale for their position. Good faith differences can arise between a taxpayer
asserting a "minimum tax" position and the IRS acting from a "maximum tax"
perspective. 2 15 Because the tax code is not cast in black and white and because all
parties are merely human, the possibility exists that one position may be preferred
over another or that both are to some extent correct.2 16 At the end of an IRS audit the
parties are left to negotiate and compromise to reach an appropriate balance, but
when compromise is impossible litigation may ensue. Requiring the taxpayer to
unilaterally reveal negotiation and settlement positions via the tax accrual workpapers
is improper. This is particularly true when the decision not to litigate is based on
factors "wholly apart from the inherent legality of what the taxpayer has done," such
as "the cost of litigation and the possibility that confidential information may be
disclosed to competitors.' '217 This process prejudices the taxpayer by improperly
weighting the balance, such that "a prudent organization might not be perfectly
candid with independent auditors once it knew that the information revealed would be
reachable under [section] 7602.' 218 The SEC laws were designed to prevent this kind
of informational protectionism. The minimal increase in IRS efficiency is thus out-
weighed by the investing public's need for complete and accurate information. 2 19
210. Auditors Say IRS Demand for Documents Is Poisoning Relations with Client Firms, Vall St. J., Jan. 15,
1981, at 25, col. 4.
211. Id.
212. IRS News Release, IR 81-49 (remarks by Roscoe L. Egger before the San Francisco Chapter of the California
Institute of Certified Public Accountants and Tax Section, San Francisco Bar Association, May 5, 1981).
213. Caplin, Tax Accrual Workpapers, supra note 40, at 81-82.
214. 677 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1180 (1983). The court recognized that
[tihe verification procedure envisioned by the [Securities Exchange Act of 1934] requires, in turn, that manage-
ment feel free to cooperate with their auditors, and to disclose to them confidential information, such as the
questionable positions taken on tax returns and willingness to settle rather than litigate when these positions are
challenged by the IRS.
Id. at 219-20.




219. See id. at 220-21.
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The majority opinion in United States v. El Paso Co. 220 accurately reflects the
conflicting IRS position. For three reasons the El Paso court rejected the taxpayer's
premise that "the accuracy of financial reports will suffer if companies must divulge
their tax pool analysis to the IRS." 22' First, the court considered this premise to be
wholly speculative.22 2 Second, the majority was unwilling to accept the view of
American corporations inherent in the taxpayer's argument. The majority cited the
Arthur Young dissent, which had expressed an unwillingness to assume that corporate
clients would violate the law by withholding information from their independent
223accountant.  Last, the taxpayer's view fails to recognize that the powers of the SEC
are sufficient to compel complete disclosure.2 2 4 Both the SEC and professional
accounting standards require an accountant to issue a qualified opinion or scope
limitation on the corporation's financial statement if material information is with-
held. 225 And the corporation faces such severe sanctions from the SEC and the
public for an unclean statement that submission to an IRS investigation is probably
the path of least resistance.
226
[T]he cost of financial deceit is high for it can cut the corporation off from the public
capital markets and expose it to private causes of action .... [I]t is the sanctions of the
securities laws-not the existence of any privilege-that provide the corporation with the
necessary incentive to be candid with its independent auditor.
227
The El Paso court refused to constrict the sweep of the IRS summons authority
for the additional reason that it was "not swayed by the argument that the public
policy of the securities laws implicitly overrides the clear grant of summons power to
the IRS."228 The court, recognizing that Congress gave the Internal Revenue Service
a broad mandate of authority to collect and protect the nation's revenue, refused to
limit the IRS summoning power "in the absence of a more profound clash between
Congressional policies.", 229 The IRS has interpreted a relevant Supreme Court de-
cision23° to require that any conflict in congressional purpose must appear clearly in
the statutes themselves. 23 1 Taking the argument one step further, the IRS has argued
that since the securities statutes and the revenue collecting laws regulate different
activities,232 no conflict exists between the two.
220. 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3342 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1982) (No. 82-716).
221. Id. at 544.
222. Id.
223. Id. (citing United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 224 (2d Cir. 1982) (Newman, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1180 (1983)).
224. Id.
225. See Nath, supra note 30, at 1592-93.
226. Id. at 1593.
227. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit at 14, United States
v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1180 (1983).
228. 682 F.2d 530, 544 (5th Cir. 1982).
229. Id.
230. St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208 (1961) (only a conflict appearing in the statutes themselves
will prevent disclosure of census information to the Census Bureau).
23 1. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit at 14, United States
v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1180 (1983).
232. Id.
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The El Paso court decided that the courts are not "free to reweave the fabric of
national legislation," because that power belongs to Congress alone.2 33 Particularly,
when the Service demonstrates administrative sensitivity and flexibility, it should be
permitted to remedy or "temper the perceived ill-effects" of its actions without
judicial interference. 234
Wigmore's fourth requirement for privilege extension is thus a veritable cost-
benefit analysis, balancing any improvements to the accountant-client relationship
against the harm to the proper disposal of litigation.2 35 The IRS generally argues that
the collection of taxes will be hampered if access to the tax accrual workpapers is
denied.236 The Service wants these documents for convenience in the auditing proc-
ess and increased convenience means added efficiency and conservation of limited
resources. 237
On the accountant's side of the argument is the possible diminution of com-
munications needed to assure compliance with SEC requirements. If the frequency or
quality of accountant-client communications is not reduced, the IRS should have
access to beneficial documents. The issue is not resolved, however, by the Service's
arguments that corporations are required to divulge material information for securities
reporting and that accountants have an independent duty to the SEC, the profession,
and public investors. The Supreme Court discredited similar arguments in Upjohn
Co. v. United States,238 in which it noted,
This response ignores the fact that the depth and quality of any investigations ... would
suffer .... The response also proves too much since it applies to all communications
covered by privilege: an individual trying to comply with the law or faced with a legal
problem also has a strong incentive to disclose information to his lawyer, yet the common
law has recognized the value of the privilege in further facilitating communications.39
The Court's analysis is plainly correct. If a corporation perceives that its audit
responses may be unfairly used against it at some future date, it is likely to hold its
comments and cooperative efforts to the minimum required by law.24° The result is
wholly undesirable considering the full disclosure objectives of the securities laws.
The Service has recognized that much of the responsibility for the conflict rests on its
shoulders and that it has the duty to reduce the tension.24' The recent litigation has
been a subtle line-drawing process to determine when the Service's authority must
233. 682 F.2d 530, 545 (5th Cir. 1982).
234. Id.
235. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
236. See Nath, supra note 30, at 1607-10.
237. See id.
238. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
239. Id. at 393 n.2.
240. [F]rankness and candor may well lead to vulnerability. This is because ... every expression of concern,
every question raised, every good-faith doubt.., must be disclosed and will inevitably invite and concentrate
IRS scrutiny. Indeed, the company may well be met by a quotation from its own attorney or accountant if it
should later challenge an IRS position or attempt a reasonable settlement of a dispute.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit at 18, United States v. El Paso
Co., 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3342 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1982) (No. 82-716).
241. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
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take a back seat to the preservation of complete communication between auditor and
client.
Wigmore's first three privilege requirements are rather easily satisfied in the
accountant-corporate client context.2 4 2 Satisfaction of the fourth and final
requirement-that the injury to the accountant-client relationship be greater than the
benefit gained in the administration of justice-is extremely difficult.243 The balanc-
ing test is ultimately for the courts. The accounting profession has argued, and the
present IRS Commissioner has admitted, 244 that communications between account-
ants and their clients have been reduced and the relationship damaged. That impaired
communication will have a negative impact on the reliability of certified financial
statements is a highly likely, and undesirable, consequence. Permitting the IRS
access to a taxpayer's legal theories and settlement positions certainly does not
benefit the administration of justice or result in the correct disposal of litigation.
Rather, disclosure of the information in tax accrual workpapers unfairly tips the
balance against the taxpayer.
The threat to the attorney-client privilege when information is discussed with an
outside accountant is also a significant problem to be considered. The Supreme Court
has evidenced a desire "to encourage full and frank communication between attor-
neys and their clients . . .[to] thereby promote broader public interests in the observ-
ance of law and administration of justice. -245 Yet, without an accountant-client
privilege a corporate taxpayer is caught between Scylla and Charybdis. If the taxpay-
er's accountant has access to the information needed for SEC certification, the tax-
payer loses the attorney-client privilege, which requires confidentiality. If the tax-
payer protects his right to the attorney-client privilege by denying access to his
accountant, he suffers his fate before the Securities Exchange Commission. 6 As the
dissenter in El Paso noted in the context of a waiver argument, "[i]f we do not take
these realities into account ... there is a substantial danger that the attorney-client
privilege for publicly held corporations, so recently reaffirmed in Upjohn Co. v.
United States... will become nothing but an empty theory."
247
The similarity and occasional overlap of function between an accountant and an
attorney should also be considered. The National Conference of Lawyers and Certi-
fied Public Accountants recognized that "[a]n important part of the CPAs' service to
clients includes tax planning, preparation of tax returns and appearances before the
Internal Revenue Service," '248 and noted, "Frequently the legal and accounting
phases are so interrelated, interdependent and overlapping that they are difficult to
242. For an article indicating that all four of the Wigmore requirements are easily satisfied, see Note, Protecting the
Auditor's Work Product from the IRS, 1982 DuKE L.J. 604, 622-23.
243. But see id.
244. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
245. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
246. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
247. 682 F.2d 530, 551 (1982) (Garwood, J., dissenting), petition for cert.filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3342 (U.S. Oct. 22,
1982) (No. 82-716).
248. National Conference of Lawyers and CPAs, Lawyers and Certified Public Accountants: A Study of in-
terprofessional Relations, 36 TAx LAW. 26, 29 (1982).
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distinguish. This is particularly true in the field of income taxation, where questions
of law and accounting are often inextricably intertwined. "249 In such a state of affairs
a communication made to an attorney may be considered privileged while the same
words communicated to an accountant remain unprotected. Rather than remove the
privilege from the attorney-client relationship, the appropriate response seems to be
some form of protection to the accountant when he is providing tax planning
advice. 2 50 Lawyers should not be able to "woo companies away from
accountants" 25 ' by promising insulation for a company's tax accrual information
when no distinction can be drawn on the basis of the type of work done. Courts have
responded by requiring that all accountant communications go through an attorney,
thereby gaining protection via the attorney-client privilege. But the use of this legal
fiction should be replaced by direct protection for the accountant's work.
IRS self-control is an inadequate solution to its conflict with the accounting
profession. 252 Although the Service, in May 198 1, adopted procedural guidelines that
require an agent, inter alia, to identify specific issues for investigation, request the
needed information from the taxpayer, limit the summons to the specifically identi-
fied issues, and receive approval for the summons from the Chief of the Examination
Division,25 3 judicial reliance on the Service to police itself suffers from a number of
deficiencies. Because an accountant's tax accrual workpapers are still summonable, a
corporate taxpayer may continue to fear disclosure of sensitive matters. 25 4 "[T]he
rule changes do nothing to relieve the unfairness of using the company's own auditor
against it in a tax investigation." 25 5 Furthermore, the new procedures do not change
the fact that the decision remains in the Service's discretion at a time when the
Service is most likely to favor itself. IRS procedures are considered informal,
nonbinding rules, 25 6 and the Service may interpret them as it chooses. 25 7
This Comment favors the creation of an accountant-client privilege, but recog-
nizes an alternative solution that is equally effective, less restrictive, and within the
bounds of existing law.
D. Substantial Countervailing Policy Analysis
In United States v. Euge25 8 the Supreme Court recognized that substantial
countervailing policies may justify limiting IRS authority to summon tax accrual
249. Id. at 33.
250. Jentz, Accountant Privileged Communications: Is It a Dying Concept Under the New Federal Rules of Evi-
dence?, I1 AM. Bus. L.J. 149, 156 (1973).
251. Legal Times, Apr. 19, 1982, at 6, col. 2.
252. But see United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 545 (5th Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W.
3342 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1982) (No. 82-716). The court noted that the change in procedural guidelines evidenced an
administrative flexibility and sensitivity that reinforced the decision not to trim the Service's authority. Id.
253. [I Audit] I.R.M. (CCH) § 4024.4 (rev. May 14, 1981).
254. Note, Protecting the Auditor's Work Product from the IRS, 1982 DUKE L.J. 604, 615-16.
255. Id. at 615.
256. United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979); Note, Protecting the Auditor's Work Product from the IRS,
1982 DUKE L.J. 604, 616.
257. Note, Protecting the Auditor's Work Product from the IRS, 1982 DUKE L.J. 604, 616.
258. 444 U.S. 707 (1980).
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workpapers. 259 Policy considerations, even if insufficient to warrant the creation of
an accountant-client privilege or a work product immunity, are adequate to require
some restriction on IRS action. A court may consider all countervailing interests.
Against the Service's concern for the efficient collection of taxes are a number of
policies that substantially reduce the efficacy of permitting IRS access to tax accrual
workpapers. A court considering this issue should recognize that permitting the
accountant to operate free from the fear of forced disclosure of client confidences
enhances the function of counselling and the moral state of the accountant as tax
counsellor;26° that protecting an accountant's tax accrual workpapers is a step toward
recognizing the evolution of accounting as a profession and the functional overlap
that has developed between accountants and lawyers; 26' that eliminating the forced
disclosure of potential settlement positions ensures a proper balance between the
taxpayer and the IRS in settlement negotiations;262 and that eliminating the fear of
disclosure to the IRS promotes complete and accurate securities reporting, which, in
turn, encourages "the maintenance of fair and honest markets in [securities]
transactions. "263
Substantial countervailing policy analysis permits a court to decide a case like
Arthur Young on the narrowest possible grounds. The information contained in tax
accrual workpapers can be protected from IRS review without the creation of a
privilege never before recognized in the federal courts. Furthermore, because sub-
stantial countervailing policy analysis applies only to a section 7602 summons, the
protection limits IRS access to tax accrual workpapers, but not the access of other
litigants.
Substantial countervailing policy analysis allows a court to choose between
standards of protection. An across-the-board approach may be warranted by the
countervailing policies previously mentioned. A court may decide that in cases deal-
ing with tax accrual workpapers a per se rule prohibiting IRS access would best serve
the interests of the public. Alternatively, a court may choose a case-by-case approach
that balances all the interests according to the fact situation at hand. Under this test
the IRS need not be absolutely precluded from information unobtainable from any
other source. A "needs test," similar to that used in Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure might be applied, 26 with the burden of proof placed on the
Service to rebut the presumption that tax accrual workpapers should be protected.
IV. CONCLUSION
A substantial number of important policy considerations should limit the tradi-
tionally broad IRS summons authority when that authority is directed toward an
independent accountant's tax accrual workpapers. These policy considerations do not
259. Id. at 711.
260. See supra note 192.
261. See supra text accompanying notes 248-51.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 215-19.
263. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 219 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1180
(1983); see supra text accompanying notes 238-40.
264. FnD. R. Civ. Ploc. 26(b)(3).
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make the workpapers irrelevant to determining the correctness of a tax return or the
amount of a person's tax liability; they do require the creation of some form of
protection for tax accrual workpapers, since no statutory prohibition exists. The work
product doctrine, enunciated in Hickman v. Taylor, is a judicial theory laden with
rules for its own application. Although the doctrine provides a potentially workable
solution to the problem, tax accrual workpapers are not prepared in anticipation of
litigation and, therefore, do not satisfy the requirements of the work product doctrine.
An accountant-client privilege, not yet recognized in the federal courts, would do
much to achieve a just resolution of the issue. Protection of the accountant-client
relationship provides an overall societal benefit that exceeds the Service's need for
increased efficiency in the collection of tax revenues and is thus justified by policy
considerations. Congress desired to provide American securities investors with com-
plete and accurate information, but did not intend that the information be used to a
taxpayer's disadvantage in litigation or in settlement proceedings.
William Fullmer
